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ON CAPTURING THE POSSIBLE
SIGNIFICANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN AND ETHOS
PETER L. STRAUSS*
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INTRODUCTION

At a recent conference, a new judge from one of the federal courts of
appeal-for the United States, the front line in judicial control of
administrative action-made a plea to the lawyers in attendance. Please, he
urged, in briefing and arguing cases reviewing agency actions, help us
judges to understand their broader contexts. So often, he complained, the
briefs and arguments are limited to the particular small issues of the case.
We get little sense of the broad context in which it arises-the agency
responsibilities in their largest sense, the institutional issues that may be at
stake, how these particular issues may fit into the general statutory
framework for which the agency is responsible, and so forth.
This Paper hopes to open a conversation about what strikes me as the
largest and most underappreciated of these failures of contextualization.
American law students, lawyers, and judges seem rarely to think about
issues of institutional design and ethos when considering the issues of
* Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University. Deep thanks to my colleague Gillian
Metzger for her thoughtful suggestions-as, for example, the matter immediately following
the opening paragraph below-and the participants in the conference at the University of
Montpellier, France, for which this Article was initially written.
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administrative law in particular concrete instances.1 I wonder if this is also
true in the legal orders of Europe.
These failures perhaps reflect discomfort in working at the shifting and
sometimes troublesome borderland between law and politics, which one
can find already expressed in the earliest of our great constitutional cases,
Marbury v. Madison.2 Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in that case
famously established the place of the courts in the constitutional order.
Distinguishing between those acts that a court might have controlled by
law, and others that were not subject to judicial constraint, he denied any
purpose to reach acts the President was entitled to command from his
subordinates. When an official
is to conform precisely to the will of the President[,] [h]e is the mere organ
by whom that will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an
officer, can never be examinable by the courts.
... The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform
duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or
and laws, submitted to the executive, can
which are, by the constitution
3
never be made in this court.

It is important to note is that we would never describe decisions of the
Administrator of the EPA about air quality in the way Chief Justice
Marshall describes decisions of the Secretary of State about foreign affairs.
The Secretary of State is exercising discretion in its largest sense, cases in
which there is no law to apply and which "can never be examinable by the
courts." The great Chief Justice was not addressing the mixed questions of
law and politics that are the everyday focus of administrative law and of
judicial review for "abuse of discretion" under our federal Administrative
Procedure Act.4 For those acts we actually depend on the possibility of
effective judicial review to justify their legality. If standards did not exist
permitting a court to assess the legality of the Administrator's acts, we
would say an unconstitutional delegation had been made. These are not
matters to be decided by politics, and they are questions examinable by the
courts. And that gives the borderline between politics and law particular

1. Such thinking does occur at the level of general theory, as in attention to the
possibility of agency "capture" by the regulated, or the desirability of alternative approaches
to the subject generally-as, for example, in the works of Professor Jody Freeman of
Harvard Law School or my colleague Charles Sable. What is generally missing is a
consideration of institutional design and ethos in the context of particular disputes arising
within the general, existing structures of administrative law; and that is the subject to which
this Paper is preliminarily addressed.
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Id. at 166, 170 (emphasis added).
4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006).
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significance.
It is not hard to point out other settings where this borderline is in play.
For example, are the constraints of our federalism to be politically or
legally enforced? Attention to "the political safeguards of federalism" has
significantly discouraged judicial involvement. Similarly, when those who
are supposed to benefit from the enforcement of regulations adopted to
protect their interest feel that those laws have been inadequately
administered, do they have judicial access in the same manner as those
against whom regulations are applied? In the late sixties and early
seventies, American courts and academicians contended that recognizing
their claims to access could provide a possible antidote to the apparent
capture and subversion of regulators by those whose behavior the
regulators were supposed to control. The subsequent conservative turn in
our Supreme Court led it to emphasize political remedies for the general
failures of government and to voice suspicion of the suitability
of the courts
6
beneficiaries.
regulatory
intended
of
claims
the
for enforcing
Still, as I insist to my students each year, the fascination of our subject
lies in its placement on the difficult and evanescent boundary between
politics and law. I am about to embark on a year's study of one of its
aspects. This will be a comparison of how presidential and parliamentary
systems handle the interface of politics and expertise in relation to the
quasi-legislative form often taken by health and safety regulation-what
Americans call rulemaking and others, often, subsidiary legislation-the
adoption of regulations at the ministerial level. The problem is captured by
a splendid recent book published by Harvard University Press, Bending
Science,7 whose theme is probably obvious from its title. Over the past
three or four decades, the United States has seen an increasing penetration
of power politics into what had previously been rationalized as the playing
out of expert judgment. In recent years this has perhaps been most obvious
outside the United States in relation to the problem of global warming. My
purpose is to study whether the differing political circumstances and
arrangements of our governmental structure, and those of various
parliamentary systems, have produced differing accommodations of the
science-politics interface. One real benefit for me of a conference like this
one is the possibility it offers of forming research alliances, as it were, that
could help me overcome my very real deficits both in understanding the
subtleties of your political systems and in speaking or reading languages
5.

The classic account is Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American

Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975).

6.
7.

E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING
INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH (2008).

SCIENCE:
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other than English and, to a much lesser degree, French.
For our purposes today, I am going to limit myself to some examples
from the American context of issues for which institutional design and
ethos both can be significant, and appear to be underappreciated by
American law students, law professors,8 lawyers, and judges. I will start
with a Supreme Court decision that in my judgment dramatically illustrates
the point, and then move on to a few perhaps less obvious examples.
I. BENZENE AND NIOSH

The decision with which I start is Industrial Union Department, AFLCIO v. American Petroleum Institute,9 known familiarly to American legal
scholars (and hereinafter referred to) as the Benzene case. The case
involved a challenge to a regulation issued by our Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) that imposed a limit of one part per million
of benzene in the air of American workplaces. Benzene is a volatile and
carcinogenic chemical present in many industrial sites. Its carcinogenicity
makes it likely that any level of exposure to it will trigger some cancers.
Of course, benzene is only one such chemical among many possible targets
of regulation. The regulatory limit OSHA set was a particularly stringent
one, and very expensive for some industries to which it would apply.
Given the stringency of the standard, an obvious concern (one captured by
later propositions about overregulation causing underregulation) was
whether the choice to regulate benzene rather than some other hazardous
chemical had been arbitrary. How had the agency chosen benzene and set
its priorities? This concern was heightened by the appearance that OSHA
had at least temporarily exempted from the standard roughly half of the
employees it might have reached, attendants at retail facilities selling
automotive fuel ("gasoline" in American parlance, "petrol" in British).
Our Supreme Court decided the case predominantly by giving the
governing statute a strange and strained interpretation. 10 For toxic
substances that statute explicitly required OSHA to chose the standard,
which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best
available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of
8.

E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional?,94 VA. L. REv. 1407 (2008)

(discussing the arguable delegation problem presented by the statute involved in the
Benzene case, next discussed in text, without once mentioning the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), or other notable institutional arrangements
constraining the Occupational Healthy and Safety Administration's (OSHA) exercise of the
authority given it).
9. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
10. There was no opinion for the Court; Justice Stevens wrote an opinion for four
Justices (Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Stewart) that has been taken to
govern the questions discussed in text. Id. at 611.
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health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to
the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life.I
This strong command pretty well excludes consideration of issues of2
cost and of general balance, as the Court would soon explicitly agree.
And the benzene standard, as such, met this test. Yet, drawing on language
concerning OSHA's regulation of ordinary workplace hazards, rather than
the special risks presented by toxic substances, the prevailing opinion
invented a threshold requirement as a precondition to OSHA's developing
any standard at all. As a condition of initiating rulemaking, it said, OSHA
must be able to demonstrate that the toxic substance for which it was
choosing to develop a regulation would pose a "significant risk" to
workers. Otherwise, the Justices worried, the breadth of discretion OSHA
would enjoy in choosing its targets would be so broad as to suggest an
improper conferral, or delegation, of authority to the agency. In other
words, the prevailing opinion supplied a priority-setting constraint.
You might be thinking that it would be rational for Congress to be
concerned with how OSHA went about setting its priorities, and also that
the approach the Court took was a rational one. I thoroughly agree with the
first proposition, and am prepared to concede as well that Congress might
have expressed its concern by a device such as the prevailing opinion
invented. The striking fact-and this is what launches us on our way-is
that while the statute does suggest that Congress thought about the
prioritization problem, it reflects that it did so by institutional design. The
Court's approach was not evident in the statutory language, and certainly
was not one that Congress clearly had chosen. The next few paragraphs
suggest how the Justices might have understood certain institutional design
elements that Congress did choose in relation to its concerns about priority
setting. These elements, they might have concluded, introduced the
elements of regularity and constraint they were understandably seeking, but
in a manner Congress had directly and explicitly provided for.
OSHA is a constituent element of the federal Department of Labor, one
of the American cabinet departments corresponding to a Ministry of Labor
In the United States, as doubtless
in a parliamentary democracy.
elsewhere, the Department of Labor is one of high political moment, whose
Secretary and principal administrators are often chosen for political
attitudes about labor matters that vary considerably as between Republican
and Democratic administrations. Aware of this, and responsive also to
industrial concerns,1 3 Congress in establishing OSHA created a quite
11.

29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000).

12.
13.

See generally Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
The political circumstances of OSHA's creation-in the wake of dramatic

revelations of workplace injury and at a time of generally heightened public enthusiasm for
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unusual agency structure. Whether it is creating an independent regulatory
commission like our Securities and Exchange Commission, an element of a
cabinet department like the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of
the Department of Agriculture, or a freestanding Executive Branch
regulator such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Congress
usually endows regulatory bodies with the full range of regulatory
authorities. The Commission, Service, or Agency has the authority to set
its priorities, and to create regulations, and to take action to enforce those
regulations, and to hear and decide in the first instance the controversies
that arise out of enforcement actions or other disputes about their
regulations' meaning or application.
In OSHA's case, Congress strikingly created distinct agencies for these
functions. OSHA, for example, is not itself permitted to adjudicate
disputes about the enforcement of its regulations. That task is allocated to
a separate independent regulatory commission, the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission (OSHRC), whose administrative law judges
and appellate commissioners serve in positions of protected tenure and
have no part in the Department of Labor's political structure. To be sure, it
does not mean nearly as much to be an independent regulatory commission
(IRC) in the United States as is commonly thought.1 4 These days, an IRC
is generally conceded to be an element of the executive arm of
government-merely an element with somewhat attenuated presidential
relationships. The President still has some appointment controls, usually
oversees the annual budget submission, and is appropriately in a
consultative relationship with IRC rulemakers if not IRC adjudicators. In
other respects too, such as legal representation and office space, the agency
is often not much different from other elements of the Executive Branch.
And the IRC's relationship with the American Congress is not at all
different from a cabinet department's: its leadership can be called up for
oversight hearings, and it depends on Congress for legislative support, as
well as for its annual appropriations. Indeed, its political vulnerability to
the Congress may be greater than a cabinet department's; a Republican
health, safety, and environmental legislation-impeded open industrial opposition. Rather,
industrialists fought their battles over institutional and procedural arrangements that might
tend to keep OSHA's impact in check-as by requiring it to rely on injury data voluntarily
supplied to a different arm of the Department rather than data OSHA itself might require be
supplied directly to itself, and by specifying unusually elaborate procedures for the making
of regulations and heightened standards for judicial review of them. The creation of
NIOSH, indeed, can be seen as a part of this pattern. See, e.g., Andrew Szasz, Industrial
Resistance to Occupational Safety and Health Legislation: 1971-1981, 32 SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 103 (1984).

14. For elaboration of the following propositions, see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separationof Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM L. REv.
573 (1984).
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chair of the independent Federal Trade Commission once remarked that the
principal difference he saw between himself and his cabinet department
colleagues in congressional relations was that he had to go before Congress
naked, without the presidential shield. To be an IRC, then, is to be
somewhat, but not entirely removed from politics. What is striking about
the creation of OSHRC, however, is that it moves the resolution of disputes
about individual workplace safety violations outside of OSHA (and for that
matter the Department of Labor) into what is arguably a more neutral
space. OSHA must share its power with another, perhaps less committed,
body.
Another element of institutional design addresses the front end of the
regulatory process: the setting of priorities for action. This element, the
one with particular relevance for the concerns about OSHA's priority
setting expressed in the Benzene case, is not OSHRC, but the National
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). The National
Institutes of Health (NIH) is a constituent element of another cabinet
department, now the Department of Health and Human Services. That
department, generally, lacks quite the political flavor of the Department of
Labor and, within its internal structure, the NIH is an arm strongly
committed to science and relatively free of politics. Placing NIOSH there,
among the National Institutes, was, then, a kind of legislative commitment,
a congressional choice for a research and science arm that would be
independent of the Department of Labor in identifying those workplace
hazards most deserving of regulatory intervention. And that is the job the
statute gives it: constant review and development of information about safe
exposure levels for toxic materials and harmful physical agents in
workplace use, that is to be transmitted to OSHA in recommendations for
its action. In effect, priorities are made NIOSH's business, not OSHA'san arrangement that one can easily imagine bringing occasional (and
presumably congressionally desired) frustration to the politician appointed
to head OSHA.
The prevailing opinion's recital of the developmental history of the
benzene standard makes clear that NIOSH pressure on OSHA drove the
course of that rulemaking.
In a 1974 report recommending a permanent standard for benzene, the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), OSHA's
research arm, noted that these studies raised the "distinct possibility" that
benzene caused leukemia. But, in light of the fact that all known cases had
occurred at very high exposure levels, NIOSH declined to recommend a
change in the 10 ppm standard, which it considered sufficient to protect
against nonmalignant diseases....

ADMINISTRATIVE LA WREVIEW

[61:SE

... In an August 1976 revision of its earlier recommendation, NIOSH
stated that [certain studies it forwarded with its advice] provided
"conclusive" proof of a causal connection between benzene and leukemia.
Although it acknowledged that none of the intervening studies had provided
the dose-response data it had found lacking two years earlier, NIOSH
nevertheless recommended that the exposure limit be set as low as possible.
As a result of this recommendation, OSHA contracted with a consulting firm
to do a study on the costs to industry of complying with the 10 ppm standard
then in effect or, alternatively, with whatever standard would be the lowest
feasible.
In October 1976, NIOSH sent another memorandum to OSHA, seeking
acceleration of the rulemaking process and "strongly" recommending the
issuance of an emergency temporary standard pursuant to § 6(c) of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 655(c), for benzene and two other chemicals believed to be
carcinogens. NIOSH recommended that a 1 ppm exposure limit be imposed
for benzene. Apparently because of the NIOSH recommendation, OSHA
asked its consultant to determine the cost of complying with a 1 ppm
standard instead of with the "minimum feasible" standard. It also issued
voluntary guidelines for benzene, recommending that exposure levels be
limited 1to5 1 ppm on an 8-hour time-weighted average basis wherever
possible.
From this recital of the history, one unhesitatingly understands the basis
on which OSHA moved forward. As it happened, and as the prevailing
opinion demonstrated in other passages, NIOSH's increasingly urgent
messages were mistaken in their interpretation of the available science.
Yet this hardly obscures the grounding of OSHA's actions in the
prioritization scheme that Congress had created and that was working in
this case.
Strikingly, the extensive briefs in the case paid no attention whatever to
the possible implication of Congress's institutional choices for the priority
questions that would so concern the prevailing opinion. Nor was even a
moment of oral argument addressed to NIOSH's institutional place-not a
question, not a line of argument. The lawyers as well as the Justices, it
would seem, were obtuse to the possible implication of the institutional
arrangements. It is not as if Congress had been inattentive. It had
addressed OSHA's choice of priorities, and addressed it in a way likely to

15. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 618-20
(1980) (internal citations and footnote omitted). Footnote 10, excluded from the above
quotation, explains how NIOSH became responsible for the development of standards for
toxic materials:
Title 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(3) requires the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) (now in part the Department of Health and Human Services) to
develop "criteria" dealing with toxic materials and harmful physical agents that

describe "exposure levels that are safe for various periods of employment." HEW's
obligations under this section have been delegated to NIOSH, 29 U.S.C. § 671.

Id. at 619 n.10.
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focus attention on available science and away from politics or other sources
of possible arbitrariness. Benzene was given priority not on a whim, but
because the scientists of NIOSH urgently and repeatedly signaled the need
to do so.
Perhaps the lawyers cannot fairly be taxed with having to anticipate the
prevailing opinion's focus on priority setting. The existing case law did not
signal the possibility of treating the stage of priority setting (rather than the
act of standard setting) as a moment of concern from a delegation
perspective. That case law was all about whether Congress had adequately
supplied standards by which to assess the legality of the eventual regulation
itself, not the choice of subject on which to regulate. The prevailing
opinion's statutory interpretation, strange and strained, could not readily
have been anticipated. But even if the lawyers can be excused, it is striking
that once the Justices concluded that priority setting presented an important
issue, they would pay no heed to NIOSH's role in that respect. If
Congress's assignment of priority-setting responsibilities to an outside,
relatively impartial, and science-centered actor was an inadequate
constraint on possible priority setting abuses, one would at least expect
some attention to the question why. And considerations of institutional
design and ethos are strikingly absent from the prevailing opinion-and,
for that matter, any of the opinions in the case.
There is another, perhaps less troublesome, way in which the Justices
revealed their disinterest in institutional factors. The plurality opinion
suggests concern that OSHA had provisionally exempted gas stations from
the standards, even though their attendants' constituted roughly half the
number of workers who-when pumping gas into consumers' cars-would
inevitably be exposed to atmospheric concentrations of benzene. This too
may have seemed arbitrary, yet further inquiry would have revealed the
reason for this action. Gas station attendants are not the only persons
present when gas is delivered into an automobile's fuel tank; indeed,
attendants need not be present at all when, as often enough happens,
consumers fill their own tanks. Protection of the public from atmospheric
hazards, as distinct from protection of workers, is the responsibility of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), an Executive Branch
bureaucracy entirely separate from OSHA and the Department of Labor.
EPA had asked OSHA for a chance to coordinate with OSHA so as to
harmonize EPA's standard for protecting consumers from atmospheric
benzene at gas stations with OSHA's analogous workers' protection
standard. Although OSHA could have delayed issuance of its general
standard until this matter had been settled, the urgent signals it was getting
from NIOSH strongly counseled against a general delay. And so it acted as
it did: acknowledging the claim of another agency to coordinate in an area
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of jurisdictional overlap, but not unnecessarily sacrificing the interest of
other workers in prompt protection. Attention to institutional factors here
would have drawn the sting of apparent arbitrariness.
And this
understanding, too, was undeveloped.
By ignoring the appropriate
demands of internal government coordination, the plurality could-and
did-make OSHA seem more arbitrary than it had been in the use of its
power.
Once again it is possible that greater attentiveness by the government's
lawyers-their anticipation of a judicial response possible if not inevitable
in the context of this dispute-could have influenced the Court's response.
The shape of opinions is never wholly the responsibility of the Court. The
government's briefs emerge from a specialized bureaucracy exquisitely
trained in and capable of doctrinal argument, but far less appreciative of
and attuned to institutional issues. Judicial review of administrative action
is front and center; how a given agency is integrated into government as a
whole-and what constraints or controls might emerge from those
relationships-is much less central a concern.
Early in my career I was a part of that bureaucracy, the Office of the
Solicitor General in the Department of Justice. It controls government
litigation in the Supreme Court, polishing the briefs and most often also
making the oral argument. A small office, its attorneys are intimates of the
Court and its doctrines, but far removed from appreciation of the shaping
contexts of agency action. The problems entailed by these characteristics
of the office's functioning were not revealed to me until four years later
when I returned to Washington, D.C., to be general counsel of an
independent regulatory commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
It was a general education in the bearing of institutional relationships and
realities, and perhaps two anecdotes will be suggestive.
First, at a certain point, the Commission permitted me to spend a week at
a seminar regularly offered by the Brookings Institution to upper-level
government civil servants. Early on, one of the lecturers used a diagram
like this one:
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Hearing office

This was a revelation to me-not that the manifold relationships or their
importance were surprising (I had been living with them for over a year
now), but rather that my prior law school teaching of administrative law
had been so completely obtuse to any relationship beyond that between
agency and court. Such a diagram became a central orienting part of my
teaching from the moment I returned to the classroom. In today's law
school world, though, it may still remain eccentric.
Second-not long after I returned from this seminar-it was necessary
to help the Commission deal with an opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that threatened substantial
disruption of its work and would become a major Supreme Court decision
in the field: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.16 Could we win the support of the Solicitor
General's Office for review of this decision? The conversations that
ensued were only about doctrine. The potential for review lay in the
possibility that the D.C. Circuit had required excessively formalized
procedures of the Commission, a question about which its opinion was
perhaps deliberately obscure.' 7 Agreeing that if it had required excessively
formalized procedures of the Commission, we would have a strong case for
Supreme Court correction of this error, the Solicitor General counseled us
to try again. If the court was clearer the second time around, he promised,
then he would gladly seek Supreme Court review on our behalf. While the
Solicitor General was interested in the shapeliness of doctrine, of course,
the Commission's interest was in effectively performing its work. From
16.

435 U.S. 519 (1978).

17. It is not unknown for an intermediate court, aware of the thinness of the doctrinal
ice on which it is constructing an opinion, to write in ways that may tend to shield it from
Supreme Court review.
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that perspective, it was incredible that the Solicitor General should suggest
such an experiment. Fortunately, approval from the Solicitor General was
not required from the point of view of the private corporation whose
license was at stake, and the corporation successfully sought Supreme
Court review. This brought the decision immediately before the Court.
II. WHITMAN AND CASAC
Underappreciation for congressional institutional design is also evident
in more recent litigation about the delegation question, Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass 'ns. 18 Here, Congress had created a scientific body

within the EPA: the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Council (CASAC),
charged with advising the agency about science issues relevant to its
regulatory responsibilities. Unlike NIOSH, CASAC is located within the
bureaucratic hierarchy of EPA itself, the agency it is charged to advise.
Yet like NIOSH, CASAC is structured in a way that makes its
responsibilities for objective judgment evident. As one of several science
advisory boards Congress has chartered within the agency, CASAC is
constituted of scientists employed full-time elsewhere-generally in
university settings-who serve EPA as special governmental employees,
not civil servants or political appointees. 19 CASAC's responsibility,
reflected on its website, is to provide "independent advice to the EPA
Administrator on the technical bases for EPA's national ambient air quality
standards."2 ° It had pursued that responsibility in the case at hand, which
concerned Clean Air Act standards for particulates and ozone, reporting the
ranges of exposure level that in its judgment raised significant public health
concerns and were within reasonable possibility of control by the industrial
sources contributing to them. As in Benzene, the agency's subsequent
action fell within the parameters that this independent, science-oriented
body had identified.
When the resulting rule was challenged in the D.C. Circuit, 2 the
majority found it offensive to the constraints of the delegation doctrine.
EPA, the court reasoned, "lacks ... any determinate criterion for drawing

18.

531 U.S. 457 (2001).

19. This is a not uncommon statutory arrangement for regulatory areas with high
science content, engineering content, or both; similar bodies can be found, for example, at
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The latter's Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards had not only a statutory role; I often witnessed the practical ways in which its
scientific judgments-identifying areas of consensus and of necessary safety concerninfluenced NRC outcomes.
20. EPA Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/
sabpeople.nsf/webcommittees/CASAC (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
21. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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lines. It has failed to state intelligibly how much is too much.... EPA's
formulation of its policy judgment leaves it free to pick any point between
zero and a hair below the concentrations yielding London's Killer Fog. 22
Yet this characterization is credible only if one ignores the institutional
constraints Congress had put in place by its creation of CASAC, and
CASAC's advice in the particular case. For the dissent in the case, its
institutional characteristics and contributions were key:
CASAC must consist of at least one member of the National Academy of
Sciences, one physician, and one person representing state air pollution
control agencies. In this case, CASAC also included medical doctors,
epidemiologists, toxicologists and environmental scientists from leading
research universities and institutions throughout the country. EPA must
explain any departures from CASAC's recommendations.
Bringing
scientific methods to their evaluation of the Agency's Criteria Document and
Staff Paper, CASAC provides an objective justification for the pollution
standards the Agency selects. Other federal agencies with rulemaking
responsibilities in technical fields also rely heavily on the recommendations,
policy advice, and critical review that scientific advisory committees
provide.23
But for the majority, the "question whether EPA acted pursuant to lawfully
delegated authority is not a scientific one. Nothing in what CASAC says
helps us discern an intelligible principle derived by EPA from the Clean
24
Air Act.",
In the Supreme Court, the Justices readily found the "intelligible
principles" that our Constitution requires for a delegation of rulemaking
authority to withstand constitutional challenge.25 But CASAC's role drew
no attention from the Court; nor does it appear that the parties argued, as
the court of appeals' dissent had, that the institutional choices Congress had
made, in themselves, had any significance for the delegation issue.

III. OVERTONPARK AND POLITICAL HEARINGS
I have written at length in other places 26 about a 1971 decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,27 whose
present large influence on American administrative law comes from its

22.

Am. TruckingAss'n, 175 F.3d at 1034, 1037.

23.

Id. at 1059 (Tatel, J., dissenting).

24. Id. at 1036.
25. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457.
26. E.g., Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls
Over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992)

[hereinafter Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park]; Peter L. Strauss, Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe-Of Politics and Law, Young Lawyers and the Highway Goliath, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 258 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
27. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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explication of the standards for judicial review of informal agency action.
In the course of getting to that discussion, the Court was required to
interpret a statute that in somewhat ambiguous terms instructed the
Department of Transportation to protect parklands from unnecessary
intrusions when making decisions about the routing of limited-access
federal highways (our Autobahns). At issue was the possible intrusion of
Interstate 40 on a unique park in the heart of Memphis, Tennessee.
One with the leisure to explore the political history of 1-40 in Memphis
and the development of federal law about the location of these roads, such
as I later had as an academic,2 8 would find that there had been well over a
decade of political dispute in Memphis about the location of the roadway.
The disputes involved state, federal, and local officials, and produced
numerous ameliorative changes in the plan for its routing and design. One
could notice, as well, a steady stream of congressional statutes--of which
the ones at issue in the case seemed only the latest expression-creating
ever-increasing opportunities for local political expression about these
issues and standards to guide their decision. Had the Court been persuaded
to accept a political understanding of the statutes at issue, which is how the
responsible administrators had understood them-had it been aware, inter
alia, of the unusually high levels of political engagement on precisely the
question of 1-40's route through Memphis, including several appearances
before Congress addressing the matter-it could easily have decided to
leave the matter at rest. After all, the moving parties before the Court were
a small volunteer group of citizens of varying motivations. Hardly
representative of the local populace, they had seized every opportunity
politics afforded them over the preceding fifteen years and had in fact
secured much change, if not the total rerouting they wished. But for the
Court, politics was self-evidently unreliable:
It is obvious that in most cases considerations of cost, directness of route,
and community disruption will indicate that parkland should be used for
highway construction whenever possible. Although it may be necessary to
transfer funds from one jurisdiction to another, there will always be a smaller
outlay required from the public purse when parkland is used since the public
already owns the land and there will be no need to pay for right-of-way. And
since people do not live or work in parks, if a highway is built on parkland
no one will have to leave his home or give up his business. Such factors are
common to substantially all highway construction. Thus, if Congress
intended these factors to be on an equal footing with preservation of parkland
there would have been no need for the statutes.
Congress clearly did not intend that cost and disruption of the
28. I was drawn to the case from memories of my puzzlement about it as a member of
the Solicitor General's office at the time it was litigated; the case was not, however, my
responsibility.
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community were to be ignored by the Secretary. But the very existence of
the statutes indicates that protection of parkland was to be given paramount
importance. The few green havens that are public parks were not to be lost
unless there were truly unusual factors present in a particular case or the cost
or community disruption resulting from alternative routes reached
extraordinary magnitudes. If the statutes are to have any meaning, the
Secretary cannot approve the destruction 29of parkland unless he finds that
alternative routes present unique problems.
Again, the Court's obliviousness to the possible success of alternative
institutional controls-in this instance, of Congress's increasingly stringent
arrangements to assure local voice in such matters, and of the changes that
the petitioners and others had in fact won over time-can be traced as
readily to the attorneys and the circumstances of litigation in the Court as to
the Justices. The case was briefed on a schedule that did not permit deep
learning about its background,30 and it was briefed by the Solicitor
General's office, which was unlikely to be sensitive to either the political
history or the broad statutory context. Nonetheless, the opinion's strong
skepticism about the utility of institutional arrangements, in my judgment,
fits well with my general theme here. As I later wrote when I did have that
academic leisure,
The statute the Overton Park Court had to interpret was open to readings
both of text and of legislative history that would either credit or discredit the
workability of political controls. The Court chose a reading that maximized
the possibilities of judicial control of agency decision through litigation,
reasoning in part that only this reading could vindicate the policies that
underlay the statute in question. The alternative reading would have credited
the possibility of effective political controls, and the Court concluded that in
the context before it these controls would inevitably fail. Overton Parkthus
presents us not only with the use of the courts as a surrogate for political
action, but also with a declaration by the Court that only the surrogate can
work ....
[I]f the inquiry whether politics could work to control the decisions
in question was an appropriate one, the negative answer the Court gave-that
politics could not have worked to control those decisions-was in error.
Political controls, so far as one can tell, were the only controls Congress had
considered; and in the instance, they were working well. A fuller
appreciation for the Overton Park controversy, whether viewed from
Washington, D.C. or Memphis, Tennessee shows wide and effective
29. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411-13 (footnotes omitted).
30. Because the bulldozers were already at Overton Park's gates, the case came to the

Supreme Court in a rush. The Court granted certiorari on December 7, 1970, with the
petitioner's brief due on December 21 and the Government's on January 4 of the following
year. Usually petitioners have ninety days, with a further sixty days permitted for the
response, and the response need not be written during a holiday period. On this abbreviated
schedule, inevitably, only the surface could be reached.
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engagement of a variety of political actors in the controversy. The effect of
the Court's action in surrogate politics was to empower one of those actors to
an extent that had not been contemplated and that is not sustainable on any
general political view....
Both the temptations and the justifications for judges to imagine their
role in political terms may seem greater when they are overseeing
administrative action. Electoral controls over administrators are at best
indirect. Although those controls exist in forms judges emphatically do not
experience-viz., the legislative oversight hearing, or the possibility of policy-based dismissal-their very inappropriateness for judges may in itself
contribute to judicial underestimation of their legitimacy and/or effectiveness
31
and may make judges think judicial control all the more important.
And, I might have added, neither the Justices nor those who present
litigation to them are likely to be deeply versed in appreciating the
possibilities and virtues of institutional controls.
IV. INSTITUTIONS JUDGES KNOW BETTER
One can identify contexts in which institutional considerations do appear
to have contributed to the Court's understanding-albeit even in these
cases with a possibly distorting effect. Take, for example, the running
debates on the Court about the uses and abuses of legislative history in
statutory interpretation. These have been sharply influenced by the Court's
understanding of the kind of institution Congress is, and the consequent
(un)reliability-indeed, susceptibility to manipulation--of the public
records of its work. The concerns Justices have expressed are well
grounded in the possible abuses of congressional process. What is perhaps
remarkable is that they are taken to reflect the norm of congressional
behavior, that no credit is given to institutional controls instinctual to
Congress's functioning as a continuous body or to the arguable differences
between settings of high and low political moment. Justice Breyer-the
one current Justice with considerable experience working in Congress and
a consequent appreciation for the ways in which its institutional controls
function-is much more prone to accept legislative history as indicative in
contexts he finds reliable than Justices who have never had that experience
and seem disposed to accept "public choice" accounts of congressional
behaviors as the norm.
The influential American scholar Jerry Mashaw, writing about the
problem of assessing the fairness and reliability of administrative
procedures, once identified three competing models that he found in
considerable tension with one another:

31.

Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park, supra note 26, at 1253-54, 1324.
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There is a substantial critical literature on the administration of
disability benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. One
strand of the commentary is concerned that the disability program fails to
The failure of
provide adequate service to claimants and beneficiaries ....
the bureaucratic decision process to emphasize the role of professional
judgment and to adopt a service orientation is seen as the program's major
deficiency.
A second, more "legalistic" perspective is concerned primarily with the
capacity of individual claimants to assert and defend their rights to disability
benefits.... In sum, the concern is with the failure of the disability decision
process to provide the essential ingredients of judicial trials.
A third strand of the critical literature chides SSA for failing to manage
the adjudication of claims in ways that produce predictable and consistent
outcomes. The concern is that the system may be out of control, and the
suggestions for reform are essentially managerial .... In short, the system is
viewed in bureaucratic terms and criticized for its inadequate management
controls.
... [T]hese criticisms reflect distinct conceptual models of
administrative justice. Second, each of the models is coherent and attractive.
But, third, the models, while not mutually exclusive, are highly competitive:
the internal logic of any one of them tends to drive the characteristics of the
others from the field as it works itself out in concrete situations.
If these hypotheses are correct, then it may also follow that the best
system of administrative adjudication may be the one most open to criticism.
A compromise that seeks to preserve the values and to respond at once to the
insights of all of these conceptions of justice will, from the perspective of
each separate conception, appear incoherent and unjust. The best system of
administrative adjudication
that can be devised may fall tragically short of
32
our inconsistent ideals.
In a number of its opinions assessing issues of procedural fairness, the
Court appears to have been influenced, in particular, by its assessment of
the possible contribution of the first of these models, "professional
treatment," and of the possible impact of its judgment on professional
values. Confronted with a challenge to a statute effectively excluding
lawyers from the claims processes of the Veterans' Administration, the
Court appeared to take solace from its staffing (largely by persons
themselves veterans) and by the consistent successes of veterans'
organizations appearing on veterans' behalf.33 In cases concerned with the
fairness of public schools' procedures in disciplining students, Justices
have expressed confidence in the professional values of teachers and
concern for the impact of proceduralizing judgments on those values.34
32.

JERRY
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DISABILITY CLAIMS 21-23 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
33. Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
34. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 594 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting); Ingraham v.
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Initially oblivious to the impact of its procedural judgments on the
professional qualities of welfare administration,3 5 the Court subsequently
reached judgments appearing to rely on those qualities in contexts where
that reliance might reasonably have been questioned.3 6 The defining
decision in the due process context, Mathews v. Eldridge,37 is similarly
motivated.
And finally in this respect, for these purposes, one may mention
Withrow v. Larkin,38 a case in which the Court was called on to assess the
possible bias of a part-time state board of physicians responsible for
disciplining doctors for ethical violations, who had been involved in
decisions about bringing administrative charges against a doctor, and the
possible criminal prosecution of him, as well as a decision of the merits of
his case. Here the institutional understanding and values the Court drew on
were its own: judges also do this, passing on arrest warrants and
preliminary hearings, and rehearing cases that may have been reversed on
appeal; their professional training is such as to permit such re-engagements
without creating disqualifying bias. Given the "presumption of honesty
and integrity in those serving as administrators ...a realistic appraisal of
psychological tendencies and human weakness" does not establish that
"conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals
poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be
forbidden. 39 There was, of course, no evidence to the point; this was
simply the Court expressing its own institutional understandings and
instincts.
CONCLUSION

One way of rationalizing these judgments about fair procedures,
certainly those most recently discussed, is to reason that they are arrangements legislatively chosen, and presumptively chosen with an eye to their
fairness as well as considerations of accuracy and efficiency. The
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977); see also Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family,
1979 SuP. CT. REv. 329, 341-42.
35.

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS

33-34 (1985).
36. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 322-23 (1971) (holding, despite an amicus
brief filed by a union of caseworkers arguing for the contrary, that a recipient must permit
home visits by a caseworker "of some training whose primary objective is, or should be, the
welfare, not the prosecution, of the aid recipient"); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(1971) (involving a Mexican-American's claim for disability payments, where the majority
relied on the medical discipline of reports by doctors who had only briefly examined the
claimant, rather than the claimant's own Spanish-surnamed treating physician).
37. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
38. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
39. Id. at 47.
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legislature, too, will have been aware of the contributions of Mashaw's
three models, and made choices with a view to their tensions and inevitable
trade-offs. Given the difficulties courts would encounter in accurately
determining such issues as "a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weakness," there is simply an insufficient basis for
courts to displace legislative judgments.
Well, one wonders, why the same modesty does not commend itself
when confronting institutional judgments like those evidently behind the
creation of bodies like NIOSH and CASAC, or the political frameworks for
decisions about road location.
Let me end as I began. This Paper hopes to open a conversation about
what strikes me as the largest and least well appreciated of our failures to
think through the intersection of law and politics. American law students,
lawyers, and judges seem rarely to think about issues of institutional design
and ethos when considering the issues of administrative law. I wonder if
this is also true in the legal orders of Europe.

